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T echnology platforms, such as Microsoft Windows, are the hubs of technology industries. We develop a framework to characterize the optimal two-sided pricing strategy of a platform firm; that is, the pricing 
strategy toward the direct users of the platform as well as toward firms offering applications that are comple- 
mentary to the platform. We compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform (such as Windows) 
with those based on an open source platform (such as Linux), and analyze the structure of competition and 
industry implications in terms of pricing, sales, profitability, and social welfare. We find that, when the plat- 
form is proprietary, the equilibrium prices for the platform, the applications, and the platform access fee for 
applications may be below marginal cost, and we characterize demand conditions that lead to this. The pro- 
prietary appiications sector of an industry based on an open source platform may be more profitable than the 
total profits of a proprietary platform industry. When users have a strong preference for application variety, 
the total profits of the proprietary industry are larger than the total profits of an industry based on an open 
source platform. The variety of applications is larger when the platform is open source. When a system based 
on an open source platform with an independent proprietary application competes with a proprietary system, 
the proprietary system is likely to dominate the open source platform industry both in terms of market share 
and profitability. This may explain the dominance of Microsoft in the market for PC operating systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Technology platforms are the hubs of the value chains 
in technology industries. Some examples of technol- 
ogy platforms are Microsoft Windows (PC operat- 
ing systems), Intel processors (PC hardware), and 
the Sony Playstation (game consoles). The firm that 
becomes a platform leader and controls a platform, 
such as Microsoft in the operating systems market, 
can maintain a strong position in the industry but also 
faces the challenge of managing the evolution of the 
platform (Gawer and Cusumano 2002). 
A technology platform may be proprietary or open 
source. A prominent example of an open source plat- 
form is Linux, an emerging operating system that is 
challenging the dominance of Microsoft in operating 
systems. The objective of this paper is to analyze the 
strategic differences between proprietary and open 
source technology platforms, and study the implica- 
tions for the software industry. 
A firm that controls a proprietary platform makes 
strategic pricing decisions for the products it sells 
directly to the end-user, as well as with respect to 
complementary products to its platform sold by other 
firms. We call this two-sided platform pricing. For exam- 
ple, firms that control game consoles set a price 
for the game console and often charge royalties to 
developers of games, following a two-sided pricing 
strategy. Microsoft licenses the operating system to 
its users, but also provides the application develop- 
ers with information and resources and also makes 
money from licensing application development tools 
and support. The ability of the platform firm to use 
pricing strategically so as to influence the complemen- 
tary goods markets has not been sufficiently analyzed 
in the literature. 
An open source platform is used in conjunction 
\\.ith complementary applications that are provided 
by for-profit firms. An open source platform cannot 
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implement a two-sided pricing strateg); but at the 
same time, it does not face the requirement of prof- 
itability, which may constrain the behavior of the 
proprietary platform firm. An emerging open source 
platform, such as Linux, can be used for free, but also 
the users face switching costs (e.g., the cost of learn- 
ing, installing, and maintaining the new operating 
system), a smaller network of applications than the 
incumbent proprietary platform, and the possibility 
of high support costs. The applications that are com- 
plementary to an open source platform can be propri- 
etary, and therefore have to be profitable to survive. 
We develop models that extend the systems and 
network economics literature and provide a frame- 
work to answer the following questions. First, what 
is the optimal two-sided pricing strategy of a propri- 
etary platform? Under what conditions does a plat- 
form firm set a positive or negative fee to providers 
of complementary applications? What are the implica- 
tions of the existence of such a fee? Second, how does 
an industry based on a proprietary platform com- 
pare to an industry based on an open source platform 
with respect to prices, profitability, and social welfare? 
Third, what is the structure of competition between 
an open source platform and a proprietary platform? 
A core strategic question for a platform leader is 
how collaborative versus competitive should its rela- 
tionship be with the providers of complementary 
goods. Our framework provides an answer to this 
question in terms of access fees versus subsidies set 
by the platform firm. Our models allow for comple- 
mentarities between the platform and each applica- 
tion, and at the same time, users have a preference for 
application variety. Thus an increase of the size and 
sales of the applications network increase the demand 
of the platform. The models also capture the exoge- 
nous switching costs incurred by the users of the open 
source platform. 
We find that the equilibrium prices for the pro- 
prietary platform, the applications, and the platform 
access fee for the applications can be below marginal 
cost. The platform firm subsidizes the application 
when roughly the willingness to pay for the platform 
is higher than the willingness to pay for the appli- 
cation, or when the own-price effect of the platform 
is weak relative to the complementarity between the 
application and the platform. The platform firm sub- 
sidizes the users of the platform when the willing- 
ness to pay for the application is high relative to the 
willingness to pay for the platform, or the own-price 
effect of the application is weak relative to the com- 
plementarity between the application and the plat- 
form. The application firm subsidizes users of the 
application when it receives a strong subsidy by the 
platform firm. When more than one application is 
compatible to the same platform, we determine how 
the interaction between the applications in terms of 
complementarity or substitutability affects the equi- 
librium. We find that the platform is less likely to sub- 
sidize them if the applications are close substitutes to 
each other. We show that it is important to analyze 
the whole system of prices to determine the appro- 
priate public policy. When the study focuses only on 
a part of the system, significant features of the strate- 
gic interaction in the industry are neglected or may 
remain unexplained. 
A two-sided pricing strategy always increases the 
profits of the platform compared to the "one-sided" 
pricing strategy profits where no fees or subsidies 
from the platform to the application are allowed. 
However, the additional value to the platform of 
using the two-sided pricing strategy can be small 
depending on the market characteristics and it may 
not offset the costs of implementing it. We find that 
the two-sided pricing strategy increases the profit of 
the application provider only when the application 
is subsidized by the platform. However, implementa- 
tion of a two-sided strategy often reduces social sur- 
plus and consumer surplus in the combined platform 
and applications markets. 
We compare industry structures based on an open 
source and a proprietary platform. For the open 
source platform, we assume that it charges a zero 
price for the operating system as well as a zero access 
fee to applications, and therefore makes zero profits. 
The users of the platform incur a positive adoption 
cost, which is exogenous and captures the costs of 
switching to the open source platform. The applica- 
tions compatible with the open source operating sys- 
tem can be proprietary and make positive profits. This 
may provide strong incentives to firms such as IBM to 
promote an open source platform, such as Linux, for 
which IBM provides proprietary applications. Indeed, 
we show that, under certain conditions, the profit 
of the application provider based on an open source 
platform may be larger than the total profit of the 
whole proprietary industry (profits of the proprietary 
platform plus applications). We also show that, when 
the cost of user switching to the open source platform 
is large, it is optimal for the application provider to 
subsidize all the users that adopt the open source plat- 
form (even though they do not all buy its application). 
The social welfare comparison of industry struc- 
tures based on a proprietary and an open source plat- 
form is, in general, ambiguous. However, we find that 
when the cost of adopting the open source platform is 
zero, and the platforms are of equal quality and sup- 
port costs, the industry based on an open source plat- 
form has the highest social welfare. The total industry 
profitability is highest when the platform is propri- 
etary and it is vertically integrated in the applications 
sector. 
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When the platform has a network of N > 1 inde- 
pendent applications, the proprietary software indus- 
try is more profitable than the industry based on an 
open source platform, if users have a strong prefer- 
ence for application variety. The variety of applica- 
tions is larger when the platform is open source. This 
happens even though the proprietary platform subsi- 
dizes the application providers. 
When a proprietary system competes with a system 
based on an open source platform, the proprietary 
system likely dominates compared to open source 
both in terms of market share and profitability. This is 
true even when the consumers' cost of adopting the 
open source platform is zero. This result may provide 
an explanation for the dominance of Microsoft in the 
software industry. 
The structure of this paper is the following. We dis- 
cuss the related literature in 52. In 53, we first analyze 
the equilibrium of a market with a proprietary plat- 
form with one complementary application where the 
platform uses a two-sided pricing strategy. Second, 
we analyze the market equilibrium when the plat- 
form is open source and then compare the proprietary 
platform with the open source platform equilibria in 
terms of prices, sales, consumers', and total surplus, 
as well as industry profitability. We then extend our 
results to the case of a platform with two and then 
with N > 2 applications in 554 and 5. Finally, we 
analyze the competition between a proprietary plat- 
form and an open source platform in 56. Concluding 
remarks and ideas for further research are in 57. 
2. Related Literature 
This paper is related to three research literature 
themes: (1) the economics of systems, (2) the eco- 
nomics of the open source software, and (3) the 
economics of networks and two-sided markets. The 
systems literature studies settings where consumers 
value systems composed of complementary com- 
ponents. The emphasis is on the implications of 
compatibility, the incentives of rival firms to make 
their components compatible, the effects of differ- 
ent ownership structures, and the implications of 
bundling. Economides and Salop (1992) study pricing 
in competing systems comprised of two components. 
Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) 
study the incentives of firms offering such systems 
to make their systems compatible. Farrell and Katz 
(2000) show that the integration of a monopolist into 
a competitive complementary market may weaken 
the innovation incentives of independent firms. Com- 
plementary components are typically assumed to be 
symmetric in the systems literature. Thus, previous 
research has not given much attention to a setting in 
which the components are asymmetric and the core 
component (platform) sets access fees or subsidizes 
the other complementary components that compose 
the system. This paper extends the systems literature 
by characterizing the platform strategies in such a 
setting. 
The literature on open source focuses mainly on 
the individual incentives to participate in open source 
projects, the incentives of firms to adopt open source 
initiatives, the business models of firms operating 
within the open source landscape, and the competi- 
tive implications of open source software (Lerner and 
Tirole 2005). Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) argue 
that open source software development combines ele- 
ments of the private and the collective innovation 
models. Johnson (2002) models the contribution to an 
open source project as a problem of private provision 
of a public good. Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002) dis- 
cuss the incentives of individual programmers and 
software firms to participate in open source projects. 
Mustonen (2003) proposes a model in which the par- 
ticipation of programmers in open source projects is 
endogenous and shows that a low implementation 
cost of an open source application is crucial for its 
survival when it competes with a proprietary applica- 
tion. Bitzer and Schroder (2003) consider competition 
in technology, rather than prices or quantities, in a 
software duopoly market. Mustonen (2005) analyzes 
when a proprietary software firm may support the 
development of substitute open source software. 
Our paper focuses on the operating system as a 
platform. It departs from the above literature by con- 
sidering the strategic differences between an open 
source and a proprietary platform and analyzing the 
implications for the structure of the software indus- 
try. In the literature on open source, the closest paper 
to this one is Casadesus and Ghemawat (2006) that 
studies competition between Windows and Linux. 
However, that paper does not consider the two-sided 
strategy of Windows as a platform because it takes 
into account only the user price of Windows and 
ignores the strategy of Microsoft toward the comple- 
mentary applications, which is crucial in our model. 
The two-sided markets and networks literature 
focuses on pricing strategies in platform settings 
such as payment systems or matching intermediaries. 
A market is two sided when the ratio of the platform 
prices matters in the equilibrium interactions between 
the two sides (Rochet and Tirole 2005). The platform 
regulates the interaction between the two sides to 
maximize its profit, therefore standard pricing rules 
may not apply to each side separately. Rochet and 
Tirole (2002, 2003) show that competition between 
platforms does not necessarily lead to an efficient 
pricing structure. The platform sets a relatively low 
price to the side that is valued strongly by the other 
side. Multihoming at one side reduces the access price 
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set to the other side. Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), 
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006), and 
Hagiu (2004) analyze related determinants of pric- 
ing structure. Katsamakas and Bakos (2004) analyze 
platform investments in two-sided networks and the 
implications of different ownership structures. Over- 
all, this literature focuses on the prices set only by 
the platform. Therefore prices such as the price set by 
application providers are.abstracted away, while these 
prices are endogenous in our model. 
Our model contributes to this literature stream by 
characterizing the microstructure of two-sided plat- 
form pricing in technology industries. We follow 
the microapproach in the networks literature (Econo- 
rnides 1996) and show how the cross-side network 
effects emerge. In the analysis that follows, we show 
an equivalence between a specification that assumes 
complementarities and a specification that assumes 
explicit network effects across the two sides of the 
market (users and application providers), thus con- 
firming the close relationstup between the two-sided 
networks literature and the systems literature.' 
3. The Model 
This section develops the main model of the paper 
analyzing a setting of a platform with one comple- 
mentary application. We start with a proprietary plat- 
form and application, and continue with an open 
source platform with a proprietary application. 
3.1. Proprietary Platform 
Consider a setting that consists of one platform firm 
selling platform (for example, operating system) A,, 
and an independent firm selling good B,, which is 
complementary to the platform (for example, appli- 
cation software). The platform firm sells the platform 
to end-users at price pa. The independent application 
provider sells the application to end-users at price p,. 
The application provider also pays a per unit access 
fee s to the platform firm (or receives a subsidy is 
s is negative), which is set by the platform firm. 
A positive access fee can be interpreted as a per unit 
licensing fee by the operating system to applications 
software provider(s). A negative access fee can be 
interpreted as a subsidy by the platform to the appli- 
cation provider(s). This subsidy from the platform to 
the application can be created by the incorporation in 
the operating system of (1) functionality that is useful 
to the application but not directly useful to the end- 
user of the operating system who does not buy the 
application, or (2) functionality that gives additional 
value to the application over and above the value it 
' Another distinguishing feature of our model is that we allow for 
users of the platform to get value even without getting access to 
the other side, i.e., buying applications. 
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adds to the naked operating system, or (3) function- 
ality that reduces the costs or improves performance 
of the applicati~n.~ 
We assume a linear demand structure. The demand 
function of the platform A, is qo = a, - bopo - dp,, and 
the demand of the application B, is ql = a, - b,p, - 
d ~ , . ~  The quantity intercept a, of the platform demand 
(representing actual sales when all prices are zero) 
depends on the inherent quality and functions of the 
platform and the variety of applications that are com- 
patible to the platform. The maximum sales of the 
platform, a,, can be larger than the maximum sales of 
the application, a,, i.e., a, 5 The parameter d mea- 
sures the strength of the complementarity between 
the platform and the application. We assume b,, b, > 
d, i.e., that the own-price effect of each product dom- 
inates the cross-price effect. Finally, we assume zero 
costs, because marginal costs of software are close to 
zero and fixed costs do not affect our analysis because 
entry and exit are not discussed. The profit function 
of the platform firm is T, = .rr,,, + .rr,,, where .rr,,, = 
p,qo is the platform profit from users, and .rr,, = sq, is 
the platform profit from the application access fees. 
The profit function of the application provider is .rr, = 
(PI - s) 41. 
Firms set prices in a two-stage game. In stage one, 
the platform sets the access fee s paid by the appli- 
cation provider. In stage two, the platform and the 
application provider set prices pa, p1 simultaneously. 
The justification of this timing is that, first, the plat- 
form firm commits on development licensing fees or 
subsidies for the application provider, and then both 
For example, Microsoft is offering embedded functions to appli- 
cation providers, access to application programming interfaces, 
resources, and information for free, effectively subsidizing appli- 
cations, while Microsoft is making money from application devel- 
opment licenses (see, e.g., developer licensing fees at http:// 
msdn.microsoft.com/subscriptions/licensing/default.aspx). Alter- 
natively, we can assume that the platform firm anticipates and 
monitors application sales, therefore it can set access fees accord- 
ingly. 
This demand system can be generated by a population of users 
of differing willingness to pay. For example, it can be generated 
by a population of users of type 0 - Uniform [0, 11 each with a unit 
demand. The demand system in the text could also be generated 
by a representative consumer with quadratic utility function. 
This is because some platform users may not buy the application 
because they find the platform sufficient for their uses. For exam- 
ple, Windows contains a browser, an e-mail application, a media 
player, and word processing features, and some users may find 
these features sufficient and not buy any applications. The fact that 
some consumers may buy only the operating system and no appli- 
cations is an important distinguishing feature of operating systems 
from other platforms such as credit card markets and markets of 
matching intermediaries analyzed in the existing two-sided mar- 
kets literature where users are required to also buy a complemen- 
tary good. 
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firms set their prices for the users and sell their prod- 
ucts. We assume that firms set prices noncoopera- 
tively, and we characterize the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibria. 
We start by analyzing the last stage of the game. 
The second stage necessary conditions for-profit max- 
imization for the two firms are aq,/apo = anl/apl = 0. 
The best response functions of the two firms in the 
second stage are po(pl) = (a, - dpl - sd)/(2bo) and 
p1 (po) = (a, - dp, + sbl)/(2bl). Solving them simulta- 
neously gives the operating system and application 
prices as functions of the platform access fee s as 
p, = (2aobl - dal - 3dbls)/(4bobl - d2) and p, = (2albo - 
da, + (2bobl + d2)s)/(4bobl - d2). Notice that dp, Ids > 0 
and dpo/ds < 0; that is, as expected, the application 
price increases with the platform fee s because the 
application firm faces a higher marginal cost, while 
the platform price decreases as the application has a 
higher price. These two effects imply that sales of the 
operating system (respectively, application) increase 
(decrease) in the platform fee s: 
4 0  dp1 %=-bo--d->0 and 
ds ' ds ds 
In the first stage of the game, the platform firm 
chooses fee s, anticipating the second-stage equilib- 
rium prices. Its necessary condition for profit maxi- 
mization is 
A marginal increase of s affects both profit streams of 
the platform firm. The profit from users increases by 
podqo/ds and decreases by qo(dpo/dsl. The profit from 
the application firm increases by q, and decreases by 
s)dq,/dsl. Both profit streams of the platform are con- 
cave (inverted U-shaped) in s, and therefore the total 
platform profit is concave is s. The platform's choice 
of s maximizes the sum of the two profit streams. The 
effect of s on the platform profit from users is 
The profit from users is decreasing at s = 0, since 
Therefore the fee s; that would maximize only the 
platform profit from users is negative. 
Figure 1 Platform Profit Streams and Access Fee s* 
Platform 
profit from -1.0 
access fees 
The effect of fee s on the platform profit from the 
application is 
This profit is increasing at s = 0 if 2albo - aod > 0. 
Then, s,' is positive, and therefore s* may be positive 
or negative (s: < s* < s,'). The access fee s* is positive 
when at s = 0 the platform profit from the applica- 
tion is increasing at a faster rate than the profit from 
users is decreasing. Figure 1 shows an example of 
that case. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the 
platform's access fee, the platform profit, the applica- 
tion's profit, and the total industry surplus. 
The two-stage game has a unique subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium given by the following prices: 
Figure 2 Profits and Total Surplus 
->- Total 0 . 5 0 L  
-0.50 
Platform -0,75 - 
profit 
-1.00 : 
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3.1.1. Equivalent Formulation with Cross-Com- 
ponent Network Effects. We can rewrite the demand 
system in an alternative but equivalent formulation 
with explicit cross-component network effects, which 
will be useful in interpreting the results 
In this setup, sales of each good depend on its own 
price as well as on a "network effect" arising from 
sales of a complementary good. The cross-component 
network effects are defined as c0 = aqo/aql, E, = 
aql/aqo. The marginal network effect coefficient c0 
captures the increase in the demand of the platform 
by a marginal increase of the application sales. In 
short, .so is the network effect of applications sales 
on platform sales. Similarly, marginal network effect 
coefficient c1 captures the increase in the demand for 
the application by a marginal increase in platform 
sales. In short, is the network effect of platform 
sales on applications sales. From the initial assump- 
tions, we have 0 < E,, c1 < 1. The network effects c,, 
c1 are useful in characterizing and interpreting the 
results. To see the equivalence of the two demand for- 
mulations, we invert the original demand system, and 
identify the coefficients as 
and 
and the explicit marginal cross-component network 
effects as c0 = d/bl, c1 = d/bo. 
3.1.2. Subsidization Conditions. An important 
issue in the two-sided markets literature is when a 
platform may subsidize the one or the other side of 
the two-sided market (see, for example, Armstrong 
2006). There have also been frequent allegations 
of below-cost platform pricing with anticompetitive 
intent. Below, we characterize the conditions under 
which the equilibrium prices are below cost, i.e., neg- 
ative in our setup of zero costs. 
Access Fee s. An increase of s from s = 0 increases 
the profit that the platform firm captures from appli- 
cation access fees, but decreases the profit that the 
platform firm captures from sales of the platform to 
users. When the first effect dominates, the platform 
sets a positive s*, and, when the second effect dom- 
inates, s* is negative. The access fee s* is negative if 
and only if 
Therefore, the larger ao/al, the more likely it is that 
the platform firm subsidizes the application provider. 
Figure 3 The Region Where s* < 0 
Essentially, this means that the platform will sub- 
sidize the application when the maximum sales of 
application is relatively small so that the platform will 
reap the network effect from the additional sales of 
the appli~ation.~ Figure 3 shows the regions where s* 
is negative for two different levels of ao/al. In the 
region where the platform provider chooses a nega- 
tive s*, is strong, which is implied by a strong cross- 
price effect (d) relative to the own-price effect (b,). 
When the platform firm subsidizes the application 
firm, the application firm sets a low or negative appli- 
cation price and this shifts the demand of the plat- 
form up given that the cross-price effect is strong. 
This shift combined with the weak own-price effect 
bo enable the platform firm to set a high price p, and 
capture a high profit from the platform users. 
Platform Price po. The platform firm sets a neg- 
ative application fee po when this allows the plat- 
form firm to set a large application access fee. The 
platform firm subsidizes the users of the platform if 
an increase of profit from an associated increase of 
access fees imposed on the application provider off- 
sets the decrease of profit from end-users. The plat- 
form price p,* is negative if and only if 
Thus the platform price is negative when the demand 
for the application is relatively strong compared to 
the demand for the platform (ao/al is small) and E, is 
strong (cross-price effect d strong relative to the own- 
price effect of the application b,). Then, a negative 
Note that the negative access fee of the platform is not an indi- 
cation of predatory pricing, and occurs naturally in a monopoly 
setting under no threat of entry, and it is not any entry-prevention 
strategy. 
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platform price combined with a strong complemen- 
tarity (large d) shifts the application demand upward. 
The strong application demand (strong a,) combined 
with a weak bl enables the application provider to set 
a high price p; and the platform firm to set a high 
access fee to the application providers. 
Application Price p,. The application firm (which is 
independent of the platform) sets a negative appli- 
cation price when its cost of subsidizing the users is 
lower than the per unit subsidy it collects from the 
platform firm. The application price is negative if and 
only if 
12 - 2EOE1 - ( E ~ E ~ ) ~  
- 1 
a1 ~ 1 ( 8 + & 0 ~ 1 )  
This condition is more restrictive than the condition 
for a negative s*, which means that the application 
price is set below marginal cost only when the appli- 
cation receives a subsidy from the platform. Similar 
to the condition for a negative s*, it is necessary that 
the platform has a larger demand than the applica- 
tion (large a,/a,), or that E, is strong, wluch is implied 
by the own-price effect of the application being weak 
relative to the cross-price effect. 
3.1:3. The Effects of Using a Two-Sided Pricing 
Strategy. A platform firm can easily follow a "one- 
sided" pricing strategy (by setting only an end-user 
price and s = 0) rather than a two-sided strategy. 
A two-sided pricing strategy can be costly to imple- 
ment (for example, to implement the two-sided strat- 
egy the platform firm needs to keep track of the 
sales of the application providers). To see the effects 
of using a two-sided strategy, we define the addi- 
tional value V, created by the two-sided strategy for 
the platform firm as the platform's profit from the 
two-sided strategy minus its profit from the one- 
sided strategy, V, = rr,' - rr;l,,,. The benefit or loss of 
the two-sided strategy for the application provider is 
defined similarly: V, = rrf - rr; I,=,. 
The two-sided strategy does not affect the equi- 
librium sales and profits when the platform and the 
application are one-to-one (perfect) complements, i.e., 
when d = b, = b, = b and a, = a, = a. Then, both the 
platform and the application firm face the same sys- 
tem demand q = a - b(p, + p,). In this case, when the 
platform sets s, there is an infinity of Nash price equi- 
libria of the form (p; = al(3b) - s, p; = al(3b) + s ,  s ) .  
At each of these equilibria, sales q,* = q; = a/3, and 
the equilibrium profit is rr; = rr; = a2/(3b). Therefore, 
in this special case, the access fee does not matter. 
Thus, in our model, the access fee s is effectively a 
device for the platform firm to discriminate between 
the users who buy the system (platform and applica- 
tion) and the users who buy only the platform. When 
the system demand is small because of a small appli- 
cation demand, then a negative access fee s* enables 
the platform firm essentially to set a high platform 
price p,' for end-users who buy only the platform and 
effectively a low price p,* + s* for end-users who buy 
the system. When the system demand is strong, a 
positive s* enables the platform firm essentially to set 
a low platform price p: for end-users who buy only 
the platform and effectively a high price p,* + s* for 
end-users who buy the system. 
To analyze the effect of the two-sided strategy, we 
need to characterize the equilibrium when the plat- 
form follows a one-sided pricing strategy, i.e., when 
s = 0 and the first stage of the game is eliminated. The 
profit function of the platform firm is then .rr, = p,qo 
and the profit function of the application provider is 
rr, = p,q,. The two-stage game with the restriction of 
s = 0 has a unique Nash equilibrium at prices 
Evaluating the effect of using a two-sided strat- 
egy, we have, as expected that if there are no costs 
of implementing the two-sided strategy, the platform 
firm is at least as well off implementing it, i.e., V, 2 0 
since the one-sided strategy is a restriction of the 
two-sided strategy at s = 0. The effect of the two- 
sided strategy on the platform value is always pos- 
itive but U-shaped in a,/a,. Therefore it might not 
be profitable for a platform firm to implement such 
a strategy when implementation is very costly. We 
also find that using a two-sided strategy benefits the 
application firm (V, 2 0) if and only if the platform firm 
subsidizes the application firm6 Consumers' and total 
surplus may increase or decrease when the platform 
firm uses a two-sided strategy rather than a one-sided 
strategy. 
3.2. Open Source Platform 
We now consider an open source platform A, and 
a complementary application B,, with demand func- 
tions q, = a: - b,c, - dp, and q, = a, - b,p, - dc,, 
respectively. We assume that the maximum demand 
a t  of the open source platform is, in general, different 
than the maximum demand a, of the proprietary plat- 
form, but all the other demand parameters a,, b,, b,, d 
are identical for both platforms. We also assume that 
the open source platform sets a zero user price and 
zero access fees to application(s), i.e., p, = s = 0. Thus 
the open source platform profits are zero. However, 
the complementary application (B,) can set a positive 
price to users. We assume that there is an exogenous 
user cost c, of platform adoption, representing the 
The effect V, of the two-sided strategy on the application firm is 
positive if ((E,E,)' + 8 - (aO/a l )~ , (8  + E,,E,))((E~E,)~ - 4 . 5 , ~ ~  - 24 + 
(a, /a ,)~,  (8 + E ~ E ~ ) )  z 0. The second parenthesis is negative, and the 
first parenthesis is negative if and only if s' is negative. 
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cost of installing and learning the open source oper- 
ating system. This exogenous cost is assumed to be 
zero for the proprietary platform. Thus, in the static 
setting of our model, c, captures the switching cost to 
the open source platform. 
The profit functions for the open source platform 
and the proprietary application are .rr, = 0 and .rr, = 
plql. The equilibrium price for the application in the 
open source software industry is p; = (al - dc,,)/(2bl). 
The firms' sales and profits at equilibrium are 
2afbl - ald - (2b0b1 - d2)c, a1 - dc, 
4; = q* - 2bl 
I 1 -  2 
Notice that the open source industry has positive 
sales, and therefore the equilibrium exists only if 
the cost c, is relatively small.7 When c, is relatively 
large, i.e., c, > (a:bl - ald)/(bobl - d2), the applica- 
tion provider may also increase its own profits by 
giving all the users of the open source platform a 
subsidy t, therefore reducing the effective platform 
adoption cost to c, - t.$ 
3.3. Vertically Integrated Proprietary Platform 
A proprietary software industry may be vertically 
integrated. For example, Microsoft produces both 
Windows and Office. Vertical integration is not pos- 
sible in an open source industry because the operat- 
ing system is not proprietary. The profit-maximizing 
prices under a vertically integrated proprietary soft- 
ware industry are 
aob, - ald albo - aod 
= 2(bobl - d2) and p; = 2(bobl - d2) '
The application price is below marginal cost (in our 
setup, negative) if and only if E, = d/bo < al/ao. There- 
fore the integrated firm sells the application below 
marginal cost when the network effect of platform 
sales on applications sales E, is sufficiently weak 
or (equivalently) when there is a relatively strong 
demand for the operating system compared to appli- 
cations resulting in a much larger demand intercept 
of the platform a, than the demand intercept of the 
application a,. Then, the extra profit that the firm 
makes from selling the platform offsets the cost of 
subsidizing the use of the application. 
In particular, q; > 0 e c, i a,/d and q,' > 0 e c, i (2a,b, - a,d)/ 
(2b0b1 - d2). 
8The analysis of this subsidization case is available from the 
authors upon request. An  example o f  this would be IBM, a provider 
of proprietary applications for Linux subsidizing Linux. 
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3.4. Comparison of Industry Structures 
We now compare the three industry structures (ver- 
tically integrated proprietary, vertically disintegrated 
proprietary, and open source platform with propri- 
etary applications) in terms of profits and social 
surplus. 
PROPOSITION 1. Among the three industry structures, 
vertically integrated proprietary, vertically disintegrated 
proprietary, and open source platform with proprietary 
applications, total industry profits are highest for the ver- 
tically integrated proprietary industry structure. 
PROOF. The total profit of the vertically integrated 
industry minus the profit of the open source indus- 
try is (ald - aobl)2/(4bl(bobl -d2)) > 0. The total profit 
of the vertically integrated industry minus the total 
profit of a vertically disintegrated proprietary indus- 
try is 
a:(16b:b: - 4d2bobl - 3d4) 
> 0. 
4b1 (8bobl + d2)2 
Intuitively, the vertically integrated industry is the 
most profitable industry structure because it inter- 
nalizes the complementarity (vertical externality) be- 
tween the platform and the application. The vertically 
integrated monopolist can always replicate the prices 
of the other two structures, therefore it can never be 
less profitable than them. 
As Proposition 2 shows, the comparison between 
the total profits of the industry based on the open 
source platform and the total profits of the propri- 
etary platform industry with independent firms is 
ambiguous. 
PROPOSITION 2. The proprietary software industry 
with independentfirms is more profitable than the industry 
based on an open source platform if and only if 
where x = ao/al is the relative sales for the platform 
relative to the application realized at zero prices for all 
products. 
An increase of the demand a, for the proprietary 
platform increases the profitability of the proprietary 
ind~s t ry .~  Therefore, when ao/al is large, the propri- 
etary industry is more profitable than the industry 
based on the open source platform. Conversely, an 
industry based on the open source platform can be 
But notice that the demand intercept at for the open source plat- 
form does not affect the profitability o f  the industry based on the 
open source platform (because the open source platform charges 
a zero price irrespective of the size of the demand), and therefore 
does not appear in the condition o f  Proposition 2. 
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more profitable than the proprietary industry when 
ao/al is relatively small, E ,  is relatively small, and E ,  is 
relatively large. This means that for a given comple- 
mentarity d ,  the own-price effect b, of the platform 
is large and the own-price effect b, of the applica- 
tion is small. Under these conditions, the applica- 
tion provider's profit is large and this strengthens the 
relative profitability of the industry that is based on 
an open source platform. 
The comparison of social surplus across the three 
industry structures is, in general, ambiguous. Propo- 
sition 3 describes the comparison of social surplus 
across the three industry structures, when c,  is small 
and the platforms have identical quality, i.e., a, =a:. 
PROPOSITION 3. Among the three industry structures 
(vertically integrated proprietary, vertically disintegrated 
proprietary, and open source platform with proprietary 
applications), the open source industry is the structure 
with the largest total welfare if the cost of open source 
adoption c, is small. 
Proof is by direct calculation. Intuitively, the indus- 
try based on the open source platform dominates the 
other .two industry structures, because the zero plat- 
form price leads to higher platform and application 
adoption. 
4. Platform with Two Applications 
4.1. Proprietary Platform with Two Applications 
We now extend the main model to the case of a plat- 
form with two applications. The two applications 
remain complements to the platform but can be either 
substitutes or complements to each other. We start 
with the analysis of a proprietary platform. 
The demand function of the platform A, is qo = a, - 
bopo - C d p , ,  and the demand of application Bi is qi = 
ai - bipi - dp, + cpj ,  where i ,  j = 1,2 .  Parameter c mea- 
sures the degree of substitution between applications 
i and j. We assume symmetric applications' demands, 
a, = a,, b2 = b,, as well as a,  < a, and b, > 2d,  b, > d,  
b, > lcl, b, > d + c. The profit functions for platform 
and applications are .rr, = poqo + s C qi and mi = (pi - 
s)qi, i = 1,2 .  
As in the earlier models, the platform sets fees to 
applications in the first stage of a game and both 
platform and applications set user fees in the second 
stage. Because of symmetric demands, the platform 
firm sets the same access price s for each application. 
The necessary conditions for profit maximization by 
the platform and the applications' firms in the sec- 
ond stage are a.rr,/apo = ami/ap, = 0. The best response 
functions of the firms are 
a, - 2dpl - sd a, - dp, + sb, 
PO(P,) = 
2bo and P,(PO) = 2bl - 
which give 
and 
Notice that dp,/ds 0 and dpo/ds < 0. The first-stage 
condition for profit maximization of the platform is 
The platform profit from users is decreasing at s = 0, 
since 
The platform profit from the application access fees is 
increasing at s = 0, since 
following from the assumption 2a,bo - aod > 0. 
There is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 
(s* ,  pot, p:) given by the following: 
s* = (2al(b,2b,(2b, - c )  +d4)  
-aod(2bobl(2b, - c)  +d2(b, - c ) ) )  
(2(2b,2bl(2b:-3blc+c2)+bod2(-7b:+2b,c+c2) 
+2d4(-b, +c)))-' 
The access fee s* is negative if and only if 
where 5, = clb,. The right-hand side of this condition 
is increasing in 5,. Therefore the platform is unllkely 
to subsidize the applications when the competitive 
effect between the applications is strong. Similarly, 
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Figure 4 Industry Protit Difference (IIP - 11°) as a Function of c 
the platform is likely to subsidize the applications 
when the applications are complementary to each 
other (e.g., a spreadsheet application and a presenta- 
tion application).1° 
4.2. Open Source Platform with Two Applications 
When the platform is open source and the two com- 
plementary applications are directly sold to end- 
users by independent for-profit firms, the equilibrium 
prices, sales, and profits are 
4.3. Comparison of Industry Structures 
The following proposition compares the profitability 
of the industry based on open source and proprietary 
platforms. 
PROPOSITION 4. When there are two for-profit applica- 
tions, the proprietary software industry is more profitable 
than the industry based on an open source platform in 
terms of total industry profits ifand only if 
where x = ao/al. 
lo Moreover, the platform price p, is negative if and only if a, /a ,  5 
2 c 0 ( ( 5 - 3 f ; )  - ( 1  + f ; ) ~ ~ ~ , ) / ( ( l -  f ; ) ( 2 ( 2 -  l ,) + (1 - ~ ; ) E ~ E ~ ) ) ;  that is, 
generally when the intercept of the platform demand is small com- 
pared to applications. 
The proprietary industry is more profitable when 
x is large. This happens because an increase of a, 
increases the proprietary industry profit, but does 
not affect the profit of the applications that are com- 
patible with the open source platform. 
When x is relatively small, the industry based on an 
open source platform can be more profitable than the 
proprietary industry. 'lhs occurs when Icl is relatively 
small. Figure 4 shows an example of the relative prof- 
itability of the two industry structures as a function 
of c , forx=l . l ,  bo=l ,  b l= l ,  d=0.3. 
Proposition 4 shows that the complementarity and 
substitutability between the applications affects the 
relative profitability of the industry based on a pro- 
prietary and the industry based on an open source 
platform. 
5. Platform with N Independent 
Applications 
5.1. Proprietary Platform 
This section generalizes the main model to N appli- 
cations that are independent from each other (that is, 
neither substitutes nor complements with each other). 
We start with the analysis of a proprietary platform. 
Let the demand function for the platform A, be qo = 
a, - bopo - Cdipi, and the demand for the applica- 
tion B, be qi = a, - bipi - dipo + Cci,pjr where i, j = 
1, . . . , N. We assume d, < b,, C d, < b,, all applica- 
tions' demands are symmetric, a, =al,  bi = b,, di = d 
(and therefore Nd < b,), and because each applica- 
tion is independent of other applications, c,, = 0, j = 
1, ..., N-1. The profit functionsare m,,=poqo+s~qi 
and .rr, = (pi -s)q,, i=1 ,  ..., N. 
The quantity intercept of the demand for the plat- 
form (realized at zero prices po = pi = 0) can be 
defined as a, = A + E(N), where A is the stand- 
alone demand for the platform, and E(N)an increas- 
ing and concave function that captures the additional 
value to consumers created by adding a variety of 
applications. 
Adding a new application i has the following addi- 
tional network effect on platform demand: [E(N) - 
E(N - I)] + cOir where cOi = d,/b,. In this equation, 
the first bracket captures the increase in the plat- 
form demand because of an increase of the variety of 
applications. This increase in the platform demand is 
significant when the users have a strong preference 
for application variety. The second term captures the 
effect of a marginal increase in the demand of the new 
application. Thus the users value the platform based 
on the variety of platform applications and the actual 
adoption of each application. 
The second-stage necessary conditions for profit 
maximization of the platform and the applications 
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are a.rr,/ap, = ari/ap, = 0, i = 1,. . . , N." Because of 
symmetry among applications, pi = p,, i = 1 ,  . . . , N .  
The best response function of an application is not 
affected by N ,  since p,(p,) = (a, - dp, + b,s)/(2bl). 
The best response of the platform firm, po(p l )  = (a, - 
Ndp, - Nds)/(2bo), is impacted by two competing 
shifts as N increases: (1)  it shifts upward because of 
the increase of application variety and (2)  it shifts 
downward because the effect of the application price 
on the platform demand is scaled with N and the lost 
profit from the application side is also scaled with N .  
The first effect dominates when users value the appli- 
cation variety strongly. 
The first-stage profit maximization condition is 
dr,/ds = 0. The effect of fee s on the platform profit 
from the applications is scaled with N .  The platform 
profit from users at s = 0, 
is decreasing only when Nda,/(2bl) < a,. 
The symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is 
As the size N of the network of applications of the 
platform increases, the profit of the platform and each 
application increases, i.e., dr f / dN  > 0 and dr;/dN > 
0. The application provider profit is not affected by 
a change in the users preference for variety because 
rf is independent of a,. 
We now determine the relationship between the fee 
or subsidy s* and the size of the applications net- 
work N .  When users have a strong preference for 
applications variety, the access fee s* is decreasing 
in N ,  and, for large N ,  it becomes negative. Then, 
the addition of a new application in the network ben- 
efits the other applications too, because they either 
pay a lower access fee or they receive a larger sub- 
sidy. When users have a strong preference for variety, 
a, increases fast as N increases. Each application sets 
a low price because it faces a low access cost (or is 
subsidized). Thus, there is a strong demand for the 
These can be written as 
= (a ,  - 2b1pi - dp,) + b1s = 0, 
platform, which enables the platform firm to capture 
most of its profit from platform sales. However, if 
users have a weak preference for application variety, 
the access fee s* is increasing in N .  Then, the plat- 
form captures most of its profit from the application 
providers. Finally, if users have a moderate preference 
for variety, s* is initially decreasing, and then increas- 
ing in N .  
The increase of the application network size N has 
a similar effect on pi. However, a larger N has the 
opposite effect on the platform price p,*. When the 
users have a strong preference for variety, dp;/dN > 
0. When the users have a weak preference for vari- 
ety, dp;/dN < 0 and p; become negative for large N .  
The distribution of the industry profit between the 
platform and the applications ( r ; / ( N r ; ) )  is U-shaped 
in N when users assign small value to application 
variety, and monotonically increasing in N when 
users value strongly variety in applications. 
Summarizing, the crucial feature in this setting is 
that, as the number of applications increases, the plat- 
form firm faces the trade off of capturing more profits 
either from the application providers fees or from the 
application users. When users value application vari- 
ety strongly, it is likely that the second effect domi- 
nates and the platform firm subsidizes the application 
providers and makes its profits from the end-users. 
5.2. Open Source Platform 
Assume that the platform is open source and N appli- 
cations are independently produced by for-profit 
firms. The demand for the platform A, is q, = a: - 
C dipi, and the demand of the application Bi is qi = 
a, - b,pi, where i, j = 1,  . . . , N .  The profit functions 
of the application firms are ri = piqi, i = 1, .  . . , N .  
We assume symmetric applications' demands, i.e., for 
di = a,, bi = b,, di = d, and as before Nd < b,. Plat- 
form sets p, = 0 and competition among application 
providers leads to the unique Nash equilibrium set 
of prices p f  = al/(2bl).  Equilibrium sales are q,* = 
(2afbl - aldN)/(2bl)  and qf = a1/2. Each application 
provider makes profit rf = a:/(4bl). The total indus- 
try profit is 11° = Na:/(4bl). 
5.3. Variety of Applications 
The total profit when the industry is based on an open 
source platform is independent of the intercept a: of 
the platform demand because the open source plat- 
form charges a zero price irrespective of the demand. 
Therefore the total profit does not depend on the 
users preference for application variety, which affects 
only a:. However, the total profit of the proprietary 
industry is increasing on a,, which is increasing in 
the application variety N .  This observation leads us to 
the following comparison of industry profits between 
an industry based on a proprietary platform and one 
based on an open source platform. 
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PROPOSITION 5. The proprietary industry is more prof- 
itable than the industry based on an open source platform, 
when the users' preference for variety is strong. 
PROOF. The total profit difference between the pro- 
prietary and the open source industry structures is 
where x = ao/a,. 
The industry based on an open source platform 
cannot internalize the users preference for variety into 
profits. In contrast, the proprietary platform is able to 
internalize the preference for variety and this leads to 
higher industry profits. The proposition implies that 
the stronger the preference for variety, the larger the 
reduction of the industry profits from a potential shift 
of the software industry to an open source platform. 
We now extend the model, allowing for free entry 
of applications in a proprietary and open source plat- 
forms. We introduce another stage at the beginning 
of the game, where each application firm decides 
whether to enter the industry. There is a population 
of application providers (N large), each offering 
one application if it decides to enter the industry. The 
fixed cost of entry is a random variable k distributed 
according to c.d.f. G(k) over [0, K], where K is large. 
Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for firm i 
to enter the industry is k, 5 r f .  Because, in our model, 
the applications are symmetric and rf is the same for 
all i, the number of applications at equilibrium will 
be N G ( ~ ) .  
The equilibrium profits for an open source applica- 
tion when there are N independent applications are 
rp = a:/(4b1), while the equilibrium profits for an 
application when the platform is proprietary are 
Direct calculation shows that ?r,P' < ry for all N. 
Therefore, at the free entry equilibrium, there will be 
larger application variety under an open platform.12 
PROPOSITION 6. The profits of an application provider 
are higher under an open source platform. Therefore the 
pee entry application variety N P  of an industry based on 
a proprietary platform is smaller than the application val'i- 
ety No of an industry based on an open source platform. 
l2 dm = (4bob, + 2Nd2)/(8bobl + Nd2) < I + Nd2 < 4b0b, e 
bod < 4b0b, e d < b, since Nd < b,. 
Even though the proprietary platform subsidizes 
the application providers when N is large and the 
application provider profit is increasing in N, still the 
application providers are better off when the platform 
is open source. The zero price of the open source plat- 
form leads to high platform adoption and higher will- 
ingness to pay for the complementary applications. 
As a result of the larger number of applications for 
the open source platform (No > NP), the social wel- 
fare of the industry based on an open source platform 
will be larger than in a proprietary industry. 
6. Competition Between Systems 
Based on a Proprietary and an Open 
Source Platform 
Consider now platforms A,, A,, where A, is a pro- 
prietary platform and A, is an open source plat- 
form and proprietary applications B,, B,, and assume 
that platform Ai is compatible only with applica- 
tion Bi. We call the pair (A,, B,) the proprietary 
system, and the pair (A,, B,) the open source sys- 
tem. The demand function of platform i is qAi = 
a, - bipAi - dp,, + e(pAj + p,,) and the demand of the 
application i is q,, = ai - bipB, - dpAi + e(pAj + pq), i = 
1,2. The parameter e > 0 captures the degree of sub- 
stitution between the two systems. As we did ear- 
lier, we assume that bi > e so that own-price effects 
dominate cross-price effects. The two platforms have 
potentially different demand intercepts a,, a,, which 
depend on the number of features bundled with each 
platform, the inherent quality of the platform, and the 
size of the network of applications compatible with 
the platform. Since platform A, is open source, pA2 = 
s, = 0 and the exogenous adoption cost of the plat- 
form is c,. For expositional clarity, we assume b, = 
b, = d = 1, i.e., that the platform and the applica- 
tion are perfect complements. Firms play a two-stage 
game, where access fee s is imposed on the applica- 
tion provider at the first stage, and end-user prices 
are determined in the second stage. 
We first analyze the case when the proprietary plat- 
form and the application are produced by different 
firms. The profit functions are = pAlqA, + slqBl, 
rBl = (pB1 - sl)qBl, and ?rh = phqB2. The second-stage 
profit maximization conditions are a.rr,,/apAl = 0, 
~ ? ~ ~ , / a p ~ ,  = 0, i = 1,2. The first-stage profit maximiza- 
tion condition is a.rr,,/as, = 0. The equilibrium sales, 
prices, and profits are 
P>, + pi, 2a1 + e(a2 + c,) 
q;, = 4; = - 2(3-e2) ' 
pL2 =0, and r = p ,  7Tfi2 = O ,  ri2 
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We focus on the effect of ai, e, and c, on the adop- 
tion and profitability of the two competing systems. 
The adoption (sales) of the proprietary platform is 
larger than the adoption of the open source platform 
when 
a2(3 - e) - 2a1(1 - e) ,, < c,. 
3+e-2e2 
This implies that, generally, for a relatively large de- 
mand for the proprietary application (large a,), a large 
transition cost for the open platform (large c,), and a 
relatively small demand for application of the open 
source platform (a, small), the proprietary platform 
will dominate in terms of market share. For a,/a, < 
2(1 - e)/(3 - e), the proprietary platform dominates 
for all nonnegative switching costs. The right-hand 
side is positive and decreasing in e; therefore for the 
inequality to hold, a larger divergence of maximum 
sales under the two platform settings is required for 
closer substitute systems. When the systems are far 
substitutes (e close to 0) and the maximum demand 
for the open source platform is less than two-thirds of 
the maximum demand for the proprietary platform, 
the proprietary platform dominates even when the 
adoption cost of the platform c, is zero. In the other 
extreme, when the systems are very close substitutes 
(e close to I), the open source platform has higher 
sales unless c, is very large (a, < c,). 
In the special case of equal maximum demands for 
the open source and the proprietary platforms, a, = 
a, = a, the proprietary platform has a larger market 
share when a(l  + e)/(3 + e - 2e2) < c,. The left-hand 
side is increasing in the degree of substitution e so 
that a higher and higher switching cost c, is neces- 
sary for the proprietary platform to dominate as the 
platforms are closer and closer substitutes. 
Total industry profits are higher for the vertically 
disintegrated proprietary system compared to the sys- 
tem based on an open source platform when 
a2(3 - e d )  - 2 a 1 ( a  - e) ,, < C,. 
3 + e a - 2 e 2  
This implies that, generally, for a relatively large 
demand for the proprietary application (large a,), a 
large transition cost for the open platform (large c,), 
and a relatively small demand for application of the 
open source platform (a, small), the proprietary sys- 
tem will dominate in terms of profits. For a,/a, < 
2 ( a  - e)/(3 - e a ) ,  the proprietary system domi- 
nates in terms of profits for all nonnegative switching 
l3 All the parentheses in this equation and the denominator are pos- 
itive since e 5 1. 
'4Tr:1+Tr; -(77;12+Tr&)=2p;L: - P $ = ( p ; \ I f i - p ; 2 ) ( p ; l f i + p $ ) >  
 OF^;^)/;<^;^ 0 ( a ~ ( 3 - e ) - 2 a ~ ( l - e ) ) ( 3 + e - Z ~ ) - ~  <crAgain, 
all the parentheses in this equation and the denominator are posi- 
tive since e 5 1. 
costs. The right-hand side is positive and decreas- 
ing in e; therefore for the inequality to hold, a larger 
divergence of maximum sales under the two plat- 
form settings is required for closer substitute systems. 
When the systems are far substitutes (e close to 0) and 
the maximum demand for the open source platform 
is less than ( 2 / 3 ) a  0.93 of the maximum demand 
for the proprietary platform, the proprietary system 
dominates in terms of profits even when the adoption 
cost of the platform c, is zero. 
In the special case of equal maximum demands for 
the open source and the proprietary platforms, a, = 
a, = a, the proprietary platform industry has larger 
profits when 
a(3 - 2 a )  +e(2- a )  
< C,. 
3 + e a - 2 e 2  
The left-hand side is increasing in the degree of sub- 
stitution e so that a higher and higher switching cost 
c, is necessary for the proprietary platform to domi- 
nate as the platforms are closer and closer substitutes. 
PROPOSITION 7. A vertically disintegrated proprietary 
system dominates a competing system based on an open 
source platform in terms of market share and profits pro- 
vided that the maximum demand of the open source sys- 
tem (a,) is relatively small compared to the maximum 
demand of the proprietary system (a,). When the substitu- 
tion between the systems is low and/or when the switching 
cost c, is high, the proprietary system is more likely to 
dominate. 
When a vertically integrated proprietary system 
competes against a system of an open source platform 
combined with a proprietary application, the profit 
functions are .rrl = pAl qAl + pBl qBl, .rr,2 = 0, and .rr,2 = 
~ ~ 9 % .  The noncooperative equilibrium prices, sales, 
and profits are 
2a1 + e(a, + c,) 
9i1 = 9I;, = P>, + pi1 = 4 - e, , pL2=O, 
and 
The vertically integrated proprietary system has a 
larger market share than the system based on an open 
source platform if (a, - a1)(2 - e)/(2 + e - e2) < c,.15 
Therefore the vertically integrated platform domi- 
nates the open source platform in terms of sales for 
a relatively large demand for the proprietary appli- 
cation (large a,), a large transition cost for the open 
lSThe second parenthesis in the numerator and the denominator 
are positive. 
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platform (large c,), and a relatively small demand for 
application of the open source platform (a, small). 
When the maximum sales of the system based on 
the open source platform (realized at all zero prices) 
are smaller than the maximum sales of the vertically 
integrated proprietary system, a, > a,, the proprietary 
system dominates for all nonnegative switching costs. 
Total profits in each system are proportional to plat- 
form sales in that structure, .r;, + TI;, = q;:, .rr;2 + 
.rr& = 9;:. Therefore the comparison between system 
profits is exactly the same as the comparison between 
system sales. 
PROPOSITION 8. A vertically integrated system domi- 
nates a competing system based on an open source platform 
both in terms of profitability and market share, unless the 
maximum demand of the open source system (a,) (realized 
at all zero prices) is larger than the maximum demand of 
the proprietary system (a,). 
Propositions 7 and 8 provide an explanation for the 
dominance of the Microsoft in the operating systems 
market. Microsoft controls also significant applica- 
tions such as the Office productivity suite. This ver- 
tical integration, along with the fact that the demand 
for Windows is larger than the demand for Linux 
(a, > a,) (because of the larger number of applications 
compatible with Windows), enables Microsoft to coor- 
dinate the provision of the platform and its applica- 
tions through appropriate pricing that internalizes the 
network effects. The proposition shows that this will 
be true even when the switching cost to Linux is zero. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We developed models that analyze the strategic dif- 
ferences between a proprietary technology platform 
such as Microsoft Windows, and an open source plat- 
form such as Linux. We show that it is important to 
evaluate competition not just in the platform market 
or just in the applications markets, but additionally 
in the combined interaction across these markets. We 
show that the introduction of a third price, a fee that 
application developers may pay or receive from the 
platform (and one that is used extensively in practice) 
makes a very significant difference in firms' compet- 
itive interactions and the evaluation of the platform 
applications competitive landscape from the point of 
view of public policy. 
In our setup, the proprietary platform firm can 
set positive prices to the end-users of the platform 
or, alternatively, subsidize them. The platform firm 
can also set positive access fees to the providers of 
applications that are compatible with the platform, or, 
alternatively, subsidize these providers. When using 
both the price to its end-users as well as the access 
fee to the platform provider, the proprietary platform 
firm follows a two-sided pricing strategy to maximize 
its profit. We analyzed this strategy and characterized 
its effects compared to a "one-sided" platform strat- 
egy that sets only end-user prices. 
When, alternatively, the platform is open source, we 
assume that the platform is provided for free to end- 
users as well as to application providers. In the open 
source platform setting, the application providers sell 
their applications at a positive price and make prof- 
its, and can also subsidize the adoption of the open 
source platform when that increases their profit. 
When the platform is proprietary, we found that 
the equilibrium prices for the platform, or the appli- 
cations, and the platform access fee for the applica- 
tions can be below marginal cost without this being 
a predatory strategy. It follows that it is important 
to analyze the whole system of prices to determine the 
appropriate public policy in technology industries. 
When the study focuses only on a part of the system, 
significant features of the strategic interaction in the 
industry are neglected or may remain unexplained. 
When more than one application uses the same 
platform, we have shown how the degree of substi- 
tutability among the applications affects the equilib- 
rium. We show that a proprietary platform is less 
likely to subsidize the applications if the substitutabil- 
ity between the applications is strong and more likely 
to subsidize them if the applications are complemen- 
tary to each other. When the platform has a network 
of N > 1 independent applications, then the platform 
profit and each application profit is  increasing' in N. 
The access fee paid by each application to the plat- 
form is decreasing in N only when the users have a 
strong preference for application variety. 
We compared a software industry based on a pro- 
prietary platform with a software industry based on 
an open source platform. We found that a vertically 
integrated industry is more profitable than both an 
open source platform industry as well as a vertically 
disintegrated proprietary industry. However, the open 
source industry is more profitable than the vertically 
disintegrated proprietary platform industry when the 
demand of the proprietary platform is not much 
stronger than the demand of the application, the plat- 
form users have a weak preference for application 
variety, and the own-price effect of the platform is 
strong, while the own-price effect of the application is 
weak. Conversely, the vertically disintegrated propri- 
etary industry is more profitable than the open source 
platform industry when the demand for the propri- 
etary platform is significantly larger than the demand 
of the application, the own-price effect of the platform 
is weak, while the own-price effect of the application 
is strong. We also found that the variety of applica- 
tions is larger when the platform is open source. 
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When a proprietary system competes with a sys- 
tem based on an open source platform, then the propri- 
etary system most likely dominates both in terms of market 
share and profitability. This holds even when the cost 
of adopting the open source platform is zero. 
Future research in this area may include a study of 
the determination of quality in the context of an open 
source platform, an understanding of the incentive 
to innovate under open source (both for the plat- 
form and the applications), and a comparison with 
the incentive to innovate in a proprietary platform 
setting, and more generally, the dynamics of compe- 
tition in a multiperiod setting. 
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